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Abstract—Code obfuscation is designed to impede the reverse
engineering of a binary software. Dynamic data tainting is an
analysis technique used to identify dependencies between data
in a software. Performing dynamic data tainting on obfuscated
software usually yields hard to exploit results, due to over-tainted
data. Such results are clearly identifiable as useless: an attacker
will immediately discard them and opt for an alternative tool.
In this paper, we present a code transformation technique
meant to prevent the identification of useless results: a few lines
of code are inserted in the obfuscated software, so that the
results obtained by the dynamic data tainting approach appear
acceptable. These results remain however wrong and lead an
attacker to waste enough time and resources trying to analyze
incorrect data dependencies, so that he will usually decide to use
less automated and advanced analysis techniques, and maybe
give up reverse engineering the current binary software. This
improves the security of the software against malicious analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reverse code engineering consists in trying to understand
the internal behavior of a binary program. This program, or
a part of it, is analyzed to extract some relevant information
from it. In some cases, this analysis is performed for malicious
purpose, such as bypassing software protections or extracting
some valuable algorithm from a compiled file. Protecting
binary code from reverse engineering may therefore be crucial
to avoid such threats.
Dynamic data tainting is an efficient analysis technique,
used in reverse engineering, to follow data dependencies, i.e.
the information flow (also called data flow), in the execution of
a program. More precisely, when a variable value is modified,
this information flow describes all data which are accordingly
modified. Dynamic data tainting (more generally dynamic flow
analysis) is used to find vulnerabilities in a binary code,
to test programs (improve test coverage) [1], [2], [3], or
debug programs (detect known bugs, such as null pointer
dereferences) [4], [5], [6].
A dynamic data tainting analysis of a program, for a given
set of interesting variables, consists in following precisely
the impact of each of these variables, step by step, on all
data manipulated in the execution of the program. Each
data depending on some interesting variable is tainted and
the concrete result of the analysis is a summary of specific
properties checked on these tainted data. These properties are
defined in a taint policy, and the goal of the analysis is to
check precisely these properties. An execution trace may be
given as an extra output, showing all steps concerning at least
a tainted data (for example, a register or a memory chunk).
Data tainting is performed by automatic tools that imple-
ment a taint policy, defining precisely when a new taint is
introduced, how to propagate a taint, and possibly what checks
are performed on tainted data [7]. A new taint is usually
introduced for input data, i.e. , data given to the program
by the user. The taints are propagated through specific rules,
corresponding to each possible instruction. The checks on
tainted data are made either manually [8] or automatically [9]
to detect specific behavior (for example, to check for a tainted
particular test value in test coverage, or to detect tainted jump
target addresses).
Consider as an example a software developer looking for
vulnerabilities in his own program by performing a dynamic
data tainting. Here, the dynamic data tainting analysis is to
check that addresses used in jump instructions do not depend
on values controlled by the user of the program (keyboard
entries). In this case, the taint policy may be defined as follows.
The taint is introduced for all keyboard input values. A simple
propagation rule of the tainting tool is the following: when
a tainted value is stored in a register and moved to another
register, the taint is propagated to the destination register and
the corresponding instruction is added to the execution trace.
Once the program is executed, the developer checks in the
resulting trace that no address is used as a tainted jump target
in a jump instruction. Indeed, if such an address was tainted,
then it could potentially be controlled from the keyboard by
an attacker and the program would be vulnerable.
Defining an accurate taint policy is however tricky. Basic
propagation rules do not take into account some specific cases
where data seem independent from each other, while there are
not. In such a case, the result is under-tainted and the analysis
is not sound: some information related to tainted data is
missing. To avoid this behavior, a cautious approach consists in
tainting data, according to their potential dependency, even if
their dependency is unclear. In this case, the analysis may lack
of precision and give over-tainted results, where tainted data
do not really belong to the data flow of the initially marked
data. Such a taint analysis then results in huge execution traces
that do not bring interesting information [10]. For example, a
too permissive taint analysis could taint all cells of an array,
when only one cell of this array should be tainted during the
considered program execution.
From another perspective, code obfuscation aims at trans-
forming a program into a semantically equivalent program,
such that a potential attacker needs much more effort to extract
relevant information from the resulting program. The attacker
(who aims at getting as much information related to the
program as possible) will spend much more time and resources
(for example, memory space) to extract relevant information
from an obfuscated code.
Many obfuscation techniques exist in the literature [11].
Some of them, called data obfuscations, aim at making the
data flow more complex and difficult to interpret. When they
are efficient, these obfuscations significantly alter the results of
taint analysis by suggesting fake dependencies between data:
the analysis gives a strongly over-tainted result, impossible to
exploit by an attacker.
This result is however useful for the attacker, who observes
a proportion of tainted data that is much higher than expected
and quickly realizes that the result is over-tainted due to an
obfuscation-based software protection. After that, the attacker
usually decides to use less automated and advanced analysis
techniques (for example, switch to the IDA disassembler to
visualize the control-flow graph and execute symbolically the
program).
An original and interesting way of deluding the attacker
is to modify the results of taint analysis so that the execution
traces look plausible. In this situation, the attacker will exhaust
available time and resources before giving up the taint analysis
approach. A first way to improve the credibility of the taint
analysis is to deliver reasonable rates for tainted data and
tainted instructions.
This paper shows that the results of a taint analysis can
be controlled, adding small code snippets to the program
after the data obfuscation. These additions slightly transform
obfuscated programs to reduce significantly the over-tainted
results due to the obfuscation. In other words, our approach
removes a lot of tainted data, so that the rate of tainted data
and instructions are similar to the ones of the non-obfuscated
program. The results of the data tainting analysis seem correct
while they are still incorrect.
To achieve this goal, we have studied different state-of-
the-art dynamic data tainting tools and the propagation rules
of their taint policies. These propagation rules are meant to
balance under-taint and over-taint and do not capture specific
cases of data dependency. Our approach exploits these specific
cases, by inserting code snippets in the program: these code
snippets do not change the behavior of the program but
alter the taint analysis (by removing taint). When inserted in
strategic program points, these code snippets alter significantly
the taint analysis so that the final trace becomes realistic.
An attacker will then identify fake interactions between data,
generated by the data obfuscation and simultaneously miss real
interactions, hidden by our code snippets. The combination
of data obfuscation with our code snippets will then strongly
distort the understanding of the program.
II. RELATED WORK
Data tainting is a well-known technique for finding bugs
or vulnerabilities in software. For example, Feist et al. use
data tainting to detect some vulnerabilities called use-after-
free in [5] while Miller et al. detect bugs involving null pointer
dereferences in [6].
Data tainting may be performed statically (i.e., without exe-
cuting the code). The results are then valid for any execution of
the program and thus may remain imprecise as they do not take
into account specific input values and execution paths. Chang
et al. [12] propose a static taint analysis based on the inputs
given by the user. Ceara et al. improve this approach [13], by
analyzing the control flow to improve the monitoring of data
dependencies.
Dynamic program analysis offers another look at programs,
studying their executions with various applications. Instrumen-
tation frameworks for building dynamic analysis tools, like
Pin [14] and Valgrind [15], provide an infrastructure for code
profiling, bug detection, or performance evaluation.
Dynamic data tainting consists then in following data de-
pendencies during an execution of a program. Dynamic data
tainting is much more commonly used than static data tainting,
in spite of its lack of generality: the result obtained is indeed
easier to obtain and valid for a single execution [16]. A
comprehensive survey of dynamic data tainting is proposed
by Schwartz et al. in [7]. There are many applications of
this technique to software security, such as preventing code
injection attacks [9], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23],
[24], [25], [26] or finding bugs in software [6], [17], [20],
[27], [28], [29].
Among state-of-the-art dynamic taint analysis tools,
TaintCheck [17] was designed to automatically detect standard
overwrite attacks (exploiting well-known vulnerabilities, such
as buffer overflow and format string). TaintCheck was the first
tool to perform a dynamic taint analysis without requiring to
compile or modify the source program. Dytan [9] was designed
a few years later to introduce data taint at any memory chunk
(and not only on network sockets as with TaintCheck). A more
recent tool is TEMU [8], the dynamic analysis component of
the BitBlaze tool suite [30]. TEMU is an extensible platform
for fine-grained dynamic binary analysis. It performs analysis
independently of the execution environment, thus facilitating
more complex analyses and enabling more trustworthy results.
Even if dynamic data tainting tools have become very
popular, their ability to analyze information flows remains
limited: recent works [31], [32], [33], [34] present malware
implementing techniques preventing efficient data taint analy-
sis. These malwares are obfuscated, so that their control flow
and data flow are much more complex to reverse engineer.
Used techniques, consisting in control-flow obfuscations, aim
at hiding control dependencies and explicit data assignments
and lead to under-tainted results. In other words, the main idea
in these works is to use control-flow based obfuscation tech-
niques in order to make dynamic data taint analysis useless.
Our work is different: we use data obfuscation techniques to
protect a binary software and then we modify the obfuscated
binary software in order to make dynamic data taint analysis
possible. Moreover, recent advanced data tainting tools are
improving their taint propagation policy to preserve their
ability to analyze such malwares. The main idea here is to
add data tainting rules in order to track more data-flow and
control-flow dependencies. The results are however mitigated:
the obtained taint analyses contain indeed a lot of false positive
data dependencies, and are thus over-tainted [33]. In the end,
even if this approach gives interesting results on specific
malwares, it does not lead to taint policies implementing very
precise and scalable analyses. Our work takes advantage of this
weakness and proposes code snippets exploiting the inherent
lack of precision of dynamic taint analysis.
In a similar way, some low-level data obfuscation techniques
obstruct dynamic data tainting analysis. These techniques add
indirection levels to hide sensitive data and cause over-tainted
results [31], [35]. In this last case, an attacker can hardly refine
the taint policy to get more relevant results: these state-of-the-
art data obfuscation techniques prevent taint analysis but the
attacker can easily detect this behavior, as these obfuscation
generate lots of over-tainted data. Restraining the over-tainting
resulting from the dynamic data taint analysis would lead the
reverse engineer to loose time analyzing fake results instead
of switching to other reverse engineering techniques.
III. OUR CONTRIBUTION
This paper presents an approach and a tool for modifying
the results of dynamic data tainting analysis. The goal of the
modification is to generate plausible results of dynamic data
tainting analysis on a program protected by a data obfuscation.
The notion of plausibility is difficult to quantify: multiple
criteria may be used. We consider here that a result is plausible
if the proportion of tainted instructions is roughly the same
as the one of a similar unprotected program. This proportion
corresponds indeed to the size of the execution trace given by
the data tainting tool and is therefore the main indicator of
under-taint or over-taint.
We study first different data tainting tools and their taint
propagation policies. We define some representative propaga-
tion rules. As none of these tools was efficient and flexible
enough (in terms of changes in the taint propagation policies),
we use our own dynamic data tainting tool based on the Pin
framework [14]; its taint propagation policy is typical of the
policies we encounter in other tools.
Following [7], we observe that typical taint propagation
rules cannot take into account specific behaviors of programs.
From these specific behaviors, we define strategies to under-
taint data and thus to mitigate the over-tainting effect of the
data obfuscation. We confirm our approach with an experi-
mental evaluation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion IV details the taint propagation rules and explain why
these rules can not be perfectly accurate. Section V shows
how code snippets can remove taint from data and presents two
examples of code snippets. Section VI details our experimen-
tation process and introduces the tools we used. Section VII
explains then our low-level code transformation, aiming at
disrupting taint analysis. Section VIII describes lastly the
experimental evaluation of our approach, followed by our
concluding remarks.
IV. TAINT PROPAGATION RULES
In a taint policy, the introduction of new taints and the
checks performed on tainted data are context-dependent. These
parts are almost immediately derived from the target of the
dynamic data tainting analysis (e.g. , debugging or finding
vulnerabilities). On the other hand, taint propagation does not
depend on the context and is quite difficult to define.
Taint propagation is based on rules, called propagation rules.
Most data tainting tools use the same basic propagation rules.
Beyond these common rules, each tool refines its analysis,
by proposing specific rules (sometimes optional). We consider
here fine-grained tools, where these propagation rules focus
on instructions.
The general principle of taint propagation is summarized
by Schwartz et al. [7]: “The result of a binary operation is
tainted if either operand is tainted, an assigned variable is
tainted if the right-hand side value is tainted, and so on”.
Rules existing in available data tainting tools (TEMU [8],
TaintCheck [17], Dytan [9]) follow this general principle. The
set of possible instructions is divided into three categories:
data movement instructions (e.g., LOAD, STORE, MOVE, PUSH,
POP), arithmetic instructions (e.g., ADD, SUB, XOR) and other
instructions (e.g., NOP, JMP).
• Data movement instructions: the destination is tainted if
the source is tainted.
• Arithmetic instructions: the result is tainted if any byte
of the operands is tainted.
• Other instructions: no taint propagation occurs.
We give as an example a dynamic data tainting analysis
of the C program described in Fig. 1, following the rules
described above. We consider that the analysis tries to find
out if the return statement depends on the input value.
x := getinput(·)
y : = 3 * x
return y
Fig. 1. Excerpt of a program for dynamic taint analysis
The executing program receives first an input value and
stores it in the x variable: the x variable is therefore tainted.
The value of the x variable is then multiplied by 3 and the
result is stored in the y variable: the y variable becomes
tainted, due to the arithmetic instruction with tainted operand
x. In the end, the check detects that the return statement (and
thus the variable y) is tainted.
With this small example, the rules seem particularly suit-
able. But dealing with real code is much more tricky. There
are many cases where the basic rules described above are
not precise enough [7]. There are ways to move a piece of
data without data movement instructions: the basic rules may
then produce under-tainted results (e.g. , because of control-
flow dependencies). Arithmetic instructions do not mix data
as much as expected by the basic rules, giving rise to over-
taint. Some of these cases may be corrected using specific
rules. Doing so has however an impact on the whole result of
the data tainting analysis, because these specific rules apply
on the whole execution of the program.
As a result, taint propagation rules are a subtle balance
between rules trying to catch any dependency between data (to
prevent under-taint) and rules trying to restrict the propagation
to the cases where an explicit dependency occurs (to prevent
over-taint).
To illustrate this behavior, we consider TEMU [8], a recent
and state-of-the-art tool among publicly available dynamic
data tainting tools [30]. TEMU is based on a secure environ-
ment (i.e. , a virtual machine), performs a dynamic analysis
of a binary code, and generates an execution trace using a
plugin called TraceCap. It uses the basic rules described above
and other rules defined for specific operations. For example,
a specific rule concerns table lookups: in a table lookup, if a
tainted input is used as an index to access an entry of the table,
then the taint is not propagated to the destination. This specific
rule (like other specific rules) can be activated or not. In fact,
even if it is very effective in operations such as conversions
between Unicode and ASCII in Windows, this specific rule
tends to under-taint the results [7], which shows that it is
difficult to develop rules that match the semantics of each
program.
V. TAINT ADJUSTING CODE SNIPPETS
Data obfuscation leads to over-tainting results in dynamic
data tainting, with basic taint propagation rules. Our goal
is to reduce significantly the over-taint so that the results
remain plausible. We indentify cases where basic propagation
rules offer an opportunity to remove taint [7]. We give as
examples code snippets taking advantage of this opportunity
by removing taint on some data stored in registers.
The concrete insertion of these code snippets and their
locations are described in Section VII. We show however here
that many code snippets can be built by a careful study of
basic propagation rules. We show moreover that these code
snippets are small and can be written with a lot of variety, so
that they remain stealth when inserted in programs.
The dynamic nature of the targeted data tainting analy-
sis offers a first opportunity. Dynamic tools have a precise
knowledge of all executed instructions but have no clear
understanding of the control flow. We consider a conditional
jump instruction: the branches created by this instruction
manipulate data in different ways. If the condition used in
the jump instruction depends on tainted data, then all data
manipulated in the branches depend on this tainted data as
well: they should therefore be tainted. Yet, because a dynamic
analysis has no way to detect when the branches end, such
taint propagation cannot be realized in practice (i.e. , there is
no propagation rule corresponding to this situation).
Using this lack of propagation, the code snippet given in
Fig. 2 will remove the taint of the register ebx supposed to
be tainted. This code snippet requires that registers eax and
ecx are available.
pushf
mov eax, 0
mov ecx, 1
l1: test ebx, ecx
jz l2
xor eax, ecx
l2: shl ecx, 1
jnz l1
mov ebx, eax
popf
Fig. 2. An example of code snippet influencing the taint propagation
More precisely, the register eax is initialized with value 0.
Then, during the execution of a loop, the value of each bit of
ebx is tested (using ecx to select the appropriate bit). If the
value is 1, then the bit is added at the same position in eax.
In this code snippet, the register ecx is never tainted, because
it is initialized with a constant, and then simply shifted. The
register eax is not tainted either, because it is initialized with a
constant and then modified with register ecx. In the last mov
instruction, the register ebx receives the value of the register
eax: its taint is therefore removed, even if the register eax
contains in fact the exact same value as ebx.
Another opportunity comes from flags. Flags are modified
by many instructions according to complex rules and are
therefore ignored by taint propagation rules. A convenient way
of removing taint is to use a flag as a temporary storage. Using
this principle, the code snippet given in Fig. 3 will remove
the taint of the register ebx, supposed to be tainted, using
instruction lahf to read flags. This code snippet requires that
registers eax, ecx, and edx are available.
pushf
mov eax, 0
mov ecx, 32
mov edx, 0
l1: shl ebx, 1
shl edx, 1
lahf
and eax, 1
xor edx, eax
sub ecx, 1
jnz l1
mov ebx, edx
popf
Fig. 3. Another example of code snippet influencing the taint propagation
More precisely, the register edx is initialized with value 0.
Then, the value of each bit of ebx is moved to the carry flag
(using a left shift instruction). This flag value is captured in ah
(and thus eax) with the lahf instruction and then inserted
in register edx. With the left shifts applied to registers ebx
and edx, the register edx will receive the initial value of
register ebx. In this code snippet, the register eax is never
tainted, because it is initialized with a constant and modified
by flags and a constant only. The register edx is not tainted
either, because it is initialized with a constant, shifted, and
modified with register eax. In the last mov instruction, the
register ebx receives the value of the register edx: its taint is
therefore removed, even if it receives in fact its initial value.
This example may look similar to the previous one. The con-
ditional jump here is however only used for the 32 iterations
of the loop. We could have written a different (larger) code
snippet without any conditional jump. In this work, we have
used only two patterns of code snippets (and their multiple
variants, see section VII). As future work, we intend to define
more patterns of code snippets from propagation rules.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
This section describes our approach for testing the impact
of data obfuscation on dynamic data tainting analysis. Its four
steps are shown in Fig. 4. In the following, we consider that
all the software tools are executed on an x86 architecture.
PINTEMU
Obfuscation
Compilation
source ﬁles
obfuscated binary
Low-level
Fig. 4. Testing the impact of a data obfuscation on a data tainting analysis
Firstly, a source program is obfuscated. Secondly, the initial
program and the obfuscated programs are compiled. Thirdly,
a dynamic data tainting analysis is performed on each of
compiled programs. Each data tainting analysis is performed
twice: once with our own tool and once with the TEMU tool
that we chose as reference. Fourthly, our two code snippets
are embedded in binary code to ensure that the dynamic data
tainting analysis of obfuscated code gives plausible results that
the attacker can attempt to exploit during reverse engineering.
This last step will be explained in the next section.
Following the criteria defined by Cavallaro et al. [31], we
chose a data obfuscation able to defeat dynamic data tainting
analysis. This data obfuscation operates over C programs. It
obfuscates the data flow of a program by adding indirection
levels (mainly by dereferencing pointers and function calls)
in the access of some fields of records, and also by randomly
modifying their addresses in memory at each field access [36].
A dynamic data tainting analysis is performed, after compi-
lation, on both programs (original and obfuscated). The results
are compared together: their difference measures the impact of
the data obfuscation on the dynamic data tainting analysis. In
this third step, we use two dynamic tainting tools: TEMU [30]
and our own tool based on the Pin framework [14].
TEMU does not support taint input from a memory region
corresponding to a data structure, which is not convenient
for tainting initially our obfuscated programs. We modify our
source programs to introduce taint data from the keyboard
and use the TraceCap plug-in for the taint analysis with
default propagation rules. At the end of the dynamic data
tainting analysis, TEMU generates a report and an execution
trace. Fig. 5 shows an excerpt of such a report. It gives the
number of instructions that were decoded from the binary
file, the total number of decoded operands (each instruction
usually consists of 0 to 2 operands), and the size of the
execution trace. The example given in Fig. 5 comes from a 10
gigabytes execution trace. The number of decoded instructions
is 4.5 times the number of tainted instructions, which is a
representative number in our experiments.
Stop tracing process 2844
Number of instructions decoded: 315585949
Number of operands decoded: 744026854
Number of tainted instructions written to trace: 72449628
Processing time: 1560.6 U: 1548.64 S:11.9602
Fig. 5. Excerpt of a taint analysis report generated by TEMU
The execution trace contains a sequence of the executed
instructions, including the values of their operands and tainted
data resulting from the taint propagation. We use the Vine
plug-in of the BitBlaze tool suite [30] to get a readable view
of such execution trace.
TEMU is a sophisticated tool that gives precise and exhaus-
tive results related to the taint propagation. Indeed, TEMU is
monitoring and tracking the data of a binary file from a virtual
machine including standard libraries and other processes. The
size of the collected traces is however huge (up to a few dozens
of gigabytes) and their interpretation is therefore difficult.
The main cause for these huge traces is that TEMU is
monitoring too many events, including all the interactions
with the runtime system. Even if this approach is generally
considered as a real strength of TEMU, we only need in our
experiments to instrument the instructions corresponding to the
C statements from the original source file that we obfuscated.
In our experiments with TEMU, we managed to extract general
information related to the behavior of the taint analysis (e.g.,
increase of the number of tainted instructions).
To understand more precisely the behavior of the taint
analysis together with the impact of our data obfuscation
on the over-taint, we chose however to implement our own
dynamic data tainting analysis tool using the Pin generic
framework [14] with similar propagation rules. Such a tool
is called a PinTool; it may add some instructions in the
currently analyzed code: the resulting code is then executed
and interpreted.
Our PinTool performs a dynamic data tainting analysis,
based a taint policy similar to the one used by TEMU. The
taint is initialized and propagated on memory addresses and
registers. First, we use a debugger to select the memory
addresses corresponding to the initially tainted data and also
the range of addresses of instructions that we trace (this range
of addresses is used to restrict the dynamic data tainting
analysis to a specific part of a program, such as a function or a
loop). Then, we instrument the code, instruction by instruction,
to propagate the taint: a memory address or a register is tainted
when it stores a tainted value. Our PinTool builds a report and
an execution trace, similar to the results given by TEMU.
Data obfuscation is applied on specific sensible data. Our
PinTool initially taints the memory addresses and registers
containing the data that the obfuscation tries to protect. The
taint propagation rules are similar to the ones of TEMU, even
if these tools are very different from each other. Indeed, TEMU
is a very effective tool, it generates very precise execution
traces containing information of which we do not take ad-
vantage (e.g. , the states of the register flags) in our working
context. Our PinTool generates much shorter execution traces
than TEMU and these traces can therefore be more easily
analyzed.
Taint source : 6500196 (0x632F64)
Start address : 4215184
End address : 4346821
Number of executed instructions : 702456
Number of tainted instructions : 976
List of Tainted addresses : [632f64] [632f96]
List of Tainted registers : RAX
#eof
Fig. 6. Excerpt of a taint report generated by our PinTool
Fig. 6 shows an excerpt of a taint report, given by our
PinTool. This taint report contains the memory address of the
initial taint (called taint source) and the range of addresses of
traced instructions [start address; end address].
We can adjust this range, for example to get shorter execution
traces. It also indicates information that was not mentioned in
the TEMU report: the list of tainted addresses and registers at
the end of the execution.
Fig. 7 shows an excerpt of an execution trace given by our
PinTool. This execution trace consists in general information
related to each instruction (its address, its disassembled cor-
responding instruction, accessed registers and access modes)
and information resulting from the taint propagation.
For example, in Fig. 7, the fourth instruction (first instruc-
tion stored at address 4063a8) is a mov instruction; its source
is tainted, so its destination, the eax register, becomes tainted
after the execution of this instruction. The next instruction in
the trace is exactly the same instruction, located at the same
address in the code: this may happen for instructions placed in
loops. Its execution does not modify the taint of the register.
After the last instruction, the register is not tainted anymore
and thus removed from the list of tainted registers.
[WRITE in 6331ec] 405992: mov dword ptr [rdx], ecx
> 6331ec tainted
(...)
(...)
[WRITE in 632f28] 405231: mov dword ptr [rbx+0xfb48], 0x0
[WRITE in 632f28] 405231: mov dword ptr [rbx+0xfb48], 0x0
[READ in 632f28] 4063a8: mov eax, dword ptr [rdx+0xfb48]
> eax tainted
[READ in 632f28] 4063a8: mov eax, dword ptr [rdx+0xfb48]
> eax already tainted
[READ in 632f00] 4062eb: mov eax, dword ptr [r12+0xfb18]
> eax freed
Fig. 7. Excerpt of an execution trace generated by our PinTool
Patch
Patch
original tainted data graph
patched tainted data graphs
1rst solution
2nd solution
A
A
A
B
B
B
T
T
T
A1
A2
A11 --- A14 A21 A22 A23
A211 A212 A231
B1 --- B3
Fig. 8. Impact of a patch location on data tainting
VII. ADJUSTING DATA TAINT
Our goal is to hide the data obfuscation process from a
dynamic data tainting analysis and provide a plausible taint
to the attacker. We focus on the most simple indicator of
plausibility, the proportion of tainted instruction given by the
analysis. We consider that a result of dynamic data tainting
analysis is plausible when the over-taint caused by the trans-
formations applied to the code does not exceed 10%. This
difference is measured between on the one hand the original
code and on the other hand the modified (after the insertion
of code snippets) and obfuscated code (obfuscated code with
inserted code snippets).
This section details the transformations that we propose to
reduce significantly the over-taint resulting from data obfus-
cations. More precisely, we insert code snippets, like the ones
described in Section V, in the obfuscated code. We adapt these
code snippets to the context of their insertion, so that they
remove the taint from specific sensible registers (containing
the sensible data, or strongly related data). These code snippets
stop then the taint propagation.
The location of these code snippets is of primary interest.
Due to their usage, we call them stop points. If they are
reached too late during program execution, then the over-taint
remains and an attacker will realize that software protections
are used in the code. On the other hand, if they are reached
too early, not enough data will be tainted, thus making the
dynamic data tainting analysis useless, since the result would
be recognizable as under-tainted.
Thus, these code snippets must be located at strategic
program points to achieve an optimal impact on the result
of the dynamic data tainting analysis. They should be placed
closely before points where the taint is spread from a single
data to multiple data. This is typically the case of function
calls with a tainted parameter (or recursive functions involving
tainted data). These code snippets have moreover an impact
only if they are concretely executed, during the dynamic data
tainting analysis. Their location must be chosen according to
the coverage of dynamic executions. At least, we must assure
that these code snippets are reachable (a single dynamic trace
is enough). We try then to select locations that are reached by
almost all dynamic executions of the program. We consider at
last parallel branches to place a code snippet on each branch,
so that no execution will bypass all code snippets.
The target of the code snippets, among sensible data, is
important as well. The right of Fig. 8 shows two graphs
resulting from dynamic data tainting performed after the
application of a code snippet. They represent two possible
solutions for stopping the dynamic data tainting. In this figure,
we only show the nodes representing tainted data for a specific
execution and consequently for a possible path. The first
solution chooses node A as a target and removes the taint
of this node closely before its propagation. This solution has
more impact on data tainting than the second solution (which
chooses node B). Indeed, the size of the subgraph having
node A as root is larger than the size of the other candidate
subgraph. Thus, our strategy is to choose the first solution,
which reduces the most the number of tainted nodes in the
graph. In practice, a first dynamic data tainting analysis is
performed before the application of code snippets, to detect
taint dependencies, and find accurate targets for code snippets.
Our solution concretely consists in adding code snippets in
obfuscated assembly code. The stealth of these code snippets
is crucial: if we insert too many similar snippets in a code, or
if our code snippets consist of too many instructions, it will
be easy for an attacker to recognize them in an obfuscated
binary code. To avoid such situations, we reduce the sizes of
our code snippets as much as possible. The negligible size
of these code snippets and the fact that we can decline them
into a multitude of different versions, makes them less easy
to detect. To generate different versions of a code snippet, we
can for instance expand loops, or use equivalent instructions
(use “xor eax, eax” instead of “mov eax, 0”, . . . ).
Our process for transforming binary files is illustrated in
Fig. 9. Firstly, we determine the memory addresses of the stop
points. To that purpose, we compile our source files and use
the IDA Pro tool [37] to disassemble the generated binary files
and to select precisely the stop points, as discussed previously.
Secondly, because we know where to add our code snippets,
we embed inline assembly code in our source files. Thirdly,
we compile these source files once again and reuse IDA Pro
to adjust, by modifying, the embedded code snippets.
The registers used in our assembly code snippets are fixed
and we may have to change them depending on the results
of register allocation. If a register used by a code snippet is
also used by the program, then we must change it (into a free
register) in the code snippet to avoid interferences between the
code snippet and the original program. Renaming registers in
code snippets is performed in a fourth step, using IDA Pro.
In doing so, we are sure that our code snippets do not change
the semantics of the analyzed program.
Fig. 9. Transforming code in order to modify the results of dynamic data
tainting analysis
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section details our experimental results obtained after
obfuscating C source programs and performing dynamic data
tainting of resulting binary files.
A. Selecting a Test Program
As our obfuscation hides some selected fields of data in
C structures (struct), we consider C programs defining
structures such that some of their fields are significantly
updated during program execution. After testing our approach
on small C programs, we selected a real program, the calcu-
lator integrated into the GNOME desktop environment. This
software consists of about 14,000 lines of C code, written in
32 source files. These files share a common data structure
manipulating some fields that could be worth considering as
sensitive data (e.g., because they are involved in the precision
of the final result given by the calculator). Follwing [36], we
choose to obfuscate four integer fields belonging to this data
structure and deemed to be sensitive fields. Then, we check
that accesses to these fields are performed during program
execution.
Then, we follow the process described in Fig. 4 and compile
the original and obfuscated programs using GCC version
4.8.0 [38] at the first level of optimization. The last step of
the process is the insertion of code snippets in binary code.
In the calculator code, we choose a stop point corresponding
to a function call. This function takes as argument one of the
initially tainted fields and introduces a lot of taint propagation.
To stop this taint propagation, we insert a code snippet at
the beginning of the code of the function. In this example,
choosing a single stop point is sufficient to generate a plausible
taint.
B. Analyzing Tainted Programs
We define several execution scenarios that we follow for
each of our taint analyses. They are representative of standard
executions of the calculator software.
Concerning the taint analyses performed by TEMU, we
obtain execution traces varying from 10 gigabytes (for non-
obfuscated programs) to 30 gigabytes (for obfuscated pro-
grams). Such traces are too big to be precisely analyzed. The
tainting reports indicate that about 200 millions of instructions
were decoded by TEMU in the non-obfuscated program,
including about 70 millions of tainted instructions. In the
obfuscated code, more than one billion of instructions are
decoded, including more than 400 millions of tainted instruc-
tions. The proportion of tainted instructions with respect to
executed instructions thus increases by 21% when obfuscating
the source program.
Concerning the dynamic data tainting analyses performed
by our PinTool, about 700,000 instructions are instrumented
in the non-obfuscated and obfuscated versions of the program.
The precise average numbers are given in Table I. Among
these instructions, 3,392 are tainted in the non-obfuscated
program and 4,688 are tainted in the obfuscated program.
The proportion of tainted instructions with respect to executed
instructions thus increases by 37% when obfuscating the
source program (the number of tainted instructions increases
by 38% from the non-obfuscated code to the obfuscated one
but the number of executed instructions increases by only
0.6%).
With both dynamic data tainting tools, we observe that
our C data obfuscation has increased the number of tainted
instructions. The number of executed instructions is much
smaller with our PinTool as it only executes the instructions
starting at the beginning of the main function of source
programs and ending when the main function yields a result.
Similarly, the number of tainted instructions is much bigger
with TEMU because we had to change the source program to
introduce the initial data from the keyboard (and not directly
at a memory location as we did with our PinTool). As a
consequence, the interactions with the keyboard are also taken
into account in the dynamic data tainting analysis. Lastly,
we also observe that the number of executed instructions has
increased when the program is obfuscated.
C. Transforming Binary Code
The code snippet that we add in the source program as an
inline assembly is our first example described in Section V
and mentioned in Fig. 2. It is applied on a tainted register
(r13d in our experiment, instead of ebx), containing the
value of an obfuscated integer field, and located in a loop
of a recursive function of the program. As soon as the two
temporary registers used in this code snippet (eax and ecx)
are available at the program point where we insert the code
snippet, this sequence of instructions does not interfere with
the original code. If one of these registers is not available,
then we need to use an available register.
As shown in Fig. 10, the taint of register r13d is removed
by the code snippet, which stops the taint propagation after the
last instruction of the code snippet we added in the program.
[WRITE in R13D] 40cb38: mov r13d, eax
> r13d freed
Fig. 10. Excerpt of an execution trace, where taint of r13d is removed
D. Results of the Patched Taint Analysis
The average results with our PinTool are summarized in
Fig. 11 and Table I. Our data obfuscation adds only 46 lines
of C instructions. After performing obfuscation and applying
assembly code snippets, the number of executed instructions
increases slightly; the number of tainted instructions decreases
from 4,688 to 3,560 tainted instructions.
In the obfuscated and patched programs, the proportion
of tainted instructions is similar to the proportion of tainted
instructions in the non-obfuscated original program. Indeed,
the difference between both codes is only 4%. Furthermore,
the code snippet has decreased the proportion of tainted
instructions by 24% on the obfuscated program. The low
increase in executed instructions results from the instructions
of the code snippet in the program.
Our results show that our low-level transformations have
the expected influence on dynamic data tainting analysis.
We could even add other code snippets (i.e. , that would be
syntactically different but semantically equivalent to the code
snippet of Fig. 2) at other stop points to decrease even more the
obfuscated obfuscated
&
patched
patched
original
100%
138%
104%
obfuscated
Fig. 11. Proportion of tainted instructions (with respect to original file)
number of tainted data. Thus, we generated a plausible taint
resulting from simple and small code changes. Diversifying
the code snippets is also an interesting solution for generating
furtive changes in binary code.
E. Summary of the Experiments
The insertion of a single code snippet restored the number
of tainted instructions, after data obfuscation, on an executable
generated from more than 10,000 lines of code. The number
of code snippets to be inserted remains thus relatively low if
their targets and locations are carefully chosen. Moreover, this
kind of protection can be inserted by someone having a good
knowledge of the program, in a reasonable time (depending on
the size of the source code, and the skills of the programmer):
a few hours were necessary to identify the target and insert
the code snippet in the calculator. This technique is then
currently manual, and requires some expertise, but may be
improved to become automated during the compilation, like
an optimization. In addition, the number of deployed code
snippets must remain low not to stop the propagation of the
taint too much, which would alert the attacker.
More generally, we have defined assembly code snippets
aiming at bypassing taint propagation rules that are commonly
used by dynamic data tainting tools. The dynamic data tainting
tools could evolve and improve their taint propagation policy
to propagate data tainting even in the presence of code
snippets.
Such adaptations of the taint propagation policy are however
not easy to build. Some instructions, such as conditional jump
instructions, are particularly tricky to handle. Too permissive
propagation rules will result in lots of tainted data after these
instructions, even with few data dependencies between these
tainted data. Such propagation rules would then probably
generate over-tainted data, even in non-obfuscated programs.
An alternative and more permissive approach would strive
for avoiding an excessive over-taint and would necessarily lead
to a trade-off between taint propagation and the definition of
precise propagation rules. Such a permissive handling of some
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF AVERAGE RESULTS OBTAINED WITH OUR PINTOOL
Original Obfuscated Obfuscated andPatched
Size of source
program (in
lines of C)
14 009 14 055 14 074
Size of original
binary file (in
KBytes)
403 406 406
Number of
executed
instructions
699633 703 713 713 471
Number of
tainted
instructions
3392 4688 3560
Number of
additional
tainted
instructions
0 1292 168
Rate of
increase of
tainted
instructions
0% 38% 4%
instructions would still leave the opportunity of building new
code snippets for stopping the taint propagation.
IX. CONCLUSION
Data obfuscation techniques tend to over-taint the results
from dynamic data tainting, thus revealing the use of ob-
fuscation techniques for generating a binary code. Attackers
very often use automatic data tainting tools when reverse
engineering programs, except when they realize that these
tools yield too much over-tainted data.
We show that modifying assembly code with a small
number of code snippets is an interesting way of fooling a
dynamic taint analysis. Most efficient obfuscation techniques
involve over-tainted data resulting from taint analysis. We are
nevertheless able to mitigate the over-taint and thus to simulate
a successful and plausible data tainting analysis. Facing our
protection, an attacker will spend a lot of time in analyzing
fake data. A more concrete evaluation of this protection, using
multiple code snippets and target programs, should confirm our
first experimental results.
Taking into account our patches in a taint propagation policy
seems to be difficult. Looking for these code snippets in a
binary code seems more reasonable. This is obviously even
easier when a same code snippet is reused at different locations
in a binary code. As future work, we shall study how to make
the detection of these code snippets more complex. We intend
to diversify our patches and to intertwine them with the rest
of the code.
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